Currently, a high percentage of accidents in railway systems are accounted to human factors. As a consequence, safety engineers try to take into account this factor in risk assessment. However, human reliability data are very difficult to quantify, thus, qualitative methods are often used in railway system's risk assessments. Modeling of human errors through probabilistic approaches has shown some limitation concerning the quantification of qualitative aspects of human factors. The proposed article presents an original method to account for the human factor by using evidential networks and fault tree analysis.
Introduction
There is little doubt that human error is the most significant source of accidents or incidents in railway systems. According to statistics of railway accidents in Korea, human errors have accounted for 61% of all train accidents from 1995 to 2004. The purpose of human reliability analysis (HRA) is to include the likelihood of human actions that may cause hazardous events occurring during the qualitative or quantitative evaluation of risk. Several new techniques for HRA were invented in the last decades: THERP, 1 HEART, 2 JHEDI, 3 etc. These techniques have been often attacked as being of dubious validity. 4, 5 One of the main critics is that human performance is not easy to quantify owing to a large number of factors affecting it and the variability of one person over others. Nevertheless, studies have been made to prove the performance of current methods. [6] [7] [8] [9] One of their drawbacks is that performance factors are dependent of the working context and a validation of the experimental data must be done. This suggest that there is a need for new methods of HRA. 10 Moreover, in the field of railway systems there has been few attempts to include human factors in safety analysis. 11 Some of the factors that cause the occurrence of human error in railway systems are classed in four categories. 12 1. Automatic action-automatism, which is a kind of human habitude. 2. Imperative idea, which is a kind of desire to do something without any reason. 3. The condition and capacity of the faculty of observation possessed by the observers, which contain mental alienation, toxic action of drugs or liquors, inefficient training, defect in the special sense like acuteness of hearing, color-blindness, acuteness of vision, etc. 4. The mental condition of the observers and their capacity at the time for the correct interpretation of what is to be observed, which contain overwork, anxiety, depressed conditions, impaired mental condition, etc.
A method was developed by Vanderhaegen et al. 13, 14 to analyze the consequences of human unreliability on railway system safety. The human behavioral degradations were characterized by a behavioral model of human unreliability that included three behavioral factors: acquisition-related factors, problem solvingrelated factors and action-related factors. Baysari et al. 15 used the human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) method to identify errors in railway and human factors contribution in accidents and incidents in Australia. In this method, four error types were proposed: unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision and organizational influences. Unsafe acts contain errors (skill-based, decision, perception) and violations (routine, exceptional), preconditions for unsafe acts contain condition of operators (adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, physical/mental limitation), personnel factors (crew resource management, personal readiness) and environmental factors (physical environment, technological environment); unsafe supervision contains inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct a known problem and supervisory violations; organizational influences contain resource management (human resources, monetary/budget resources, equipment/facility resources), organizational climate (structure, policies, culture) and organizational process (operations, procedures, oversight). From the classification of error types, the causes of human errors can be deduced. In 2009, two human error identification techniques were used by Baysari et al. 16 in railway systems: the HFACS method and the technique for the retrospective and predictive analysis of cognitive errors (TRACEr-Rail version). The HFACS method identified errors of all operators in railway systems, but the TRACE-Rail method identified only errors of drivers.
In the TRACE-Rail method, factors that cause driver errors were listed as follows: train/infrastructure/traffic, communications, procedures/documentation, information, training/knowledge/experience, workplace design/ human-machine interaction/equipment, in-cab environment, personal factors and social and team factors. Kim et al. 17 explained that human error analysis was a time-consuming task and a computer-aided system that helps to analyse human error in railway systems was developed. This system supported the hierarchy of error causes and the relations between these causes because of predefined links. 11 presented an application of functional resonance accident models (FRAM) in safety analysis of railway traffic supervision using modern automatic train supervision (ATS) systems. This study included not only technological, but also human and organizational components. However, these works are mostly of a qualitative nature mainly because of the difficulty to quantify human behavior. As stated by Boring et al. 7 one of the lessons learned on benchmarking from the international HRA empirical study is the fact that taking into account both qualitative and quantitative elements in the prediction of HRA methods allowed a more complete understanding of the HRA methods' strengths and weaknesses in predicting equipments performance. Human behavior is considered as surrounded by epistemic uncertainties, thus needing the use of proper theories to represent and propagate the uncertainty in risk analysis.
During the last decades, the reliability-assessment community recognized that the distinction between different types of uncertainties plays an important role in reliability evaluation. 18, 19 Uncertainty is considered of two types: aleatory uncertainty that arises from natural stochasticity and epistemic uncertainty that arises from incompleteness of knowledge or data. 20 The distinction is useful because epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by acquiring knowledge on the studied system.
The classical probabilistic approach was widely used to manage aleatory uncertainties in risk and reliability assessments. 21 This approach was based on the definition given by Laplace of the probability of an event as the ratio of the number of cases favorable to it, to the number of all possible cases when all cases are equally possible. 22 The frequentist probabilistic approach introduced by Venn, 23 which defined the event probability as the limit of its relative frequency in a large number of trials, was also widely used to describe aleatory uncertainties.
To describe epistemic uncertainties, De Finetti 24 introduced the subjective probabilities of an event to indicate the degree to which the expert believes it. Kaplan and Garrik 25 introduced the concept of probability of frequency to expand their definition of risk. Cornell 26 used the six levels of uncertainty to obtain a family of risk curves in the presence of both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. The Bayesian approach proposed the use of subjective probabilities to represent expert judgement. The probability distributions representing the aleatory uncertainties are first proposed. The epistemic uncertainties about the parameter values of the distributions are then represented by prior subjective probability distributions. 25 The equation of Bayes is used to compute the new epistemic uncertainties in terms of the posterior distributions in case of new reliability data. Finally, the predictive distributions of the quantities of interest are derived by using the total probability law. The predictive distributions are subjective, but they also take into account the aleatory uncertainties represented by the prior probability models. 18 However, There are some critics about representing epistemic uncertainties using subjective probabilities.
Particularly, in the case of components that fail only rarely, such as railway systems or components that have not been operated long enough to generate a sufficient quantity of data. This is also the case of human errors. As stated by Konstandinidoua et al., 27 the limitations in the analysis of human actions in PRAs are always recognized as a constraint in the application of PRA results. The fundamental limitations are: insufficient data; methodological limitations related to subjectivity of analysts and expert judgement; uncertainty concerning the actual behavior of people during accident conditions.
In this work we are concerned with the problem of data insufficiency. For example, when there is little information about the value of a parameter a, the choice of probability distribution may not be appropriate. For example, there is a difference between saying that all that is known about the parameter a is that its value is located somewhere in an interval ½x, y and saying that a uniform distribution on [x,y] characterizes degrees of belief with respect to where the value of this parameter is located in the interval ½x, y. 28 Furthermore, in a situation of ignorance, a Bayesian approach must equally allocate subjective probabilities over the frame of discernment. Thus, there is no distinction between uncertainty and ignorance. A number of alternatives theories based on different notions of uncertainty were proposed to capture the imprecision in subjective probabilities.
Baudrit et al. 29 explained that random variability can be represented by probability distribution functions, imprecision (or partial ignorance) is better accounted for by possibility distributions (or families of probability distributions) and thus propose a hybrid method that jointly propagates probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty in risk assessment. Tucker and Ferson 30 propose a probability bounds analysis that combines probability theory and interval arithmetic to produce probability boxes (p-boxes), structures that allow the comprehensive propagation of both variability and uncertainty through calculations in a rigorous way. The belief functions theory, also known as the Dempster-Shafer or evidence theory, is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. Whereas the Bayesian theory requires probabilities for each question of interest, belief functions allow us to base degrees of belief for one question on probabilities for a related question. 31 To illustrate the idea of obtaining degrees of belief for one question from subjective probabilities for another, we propose an example in risk assessment inspired from the example of limb given by Shafer. Suppose we have subjective probabilities for the reliability of a risk expert A. The probability that A is reliable is 0.75, and the probability that A is not reliable is 0.25. The risk expert A reports that a component i is failed. This information, which must be true if A is reliable, is not necessarily false if A is not reliable.
The risk expert testimony justifies a 0.75 degree of belief that the component i is failed, but only a 0 degree of belief (not a 0.25 degree of belief) that the component i is not failed. This value does not mean that we are sure that the component i is failed, as a zero probability would. It means that the risk expert's testimony gives us no reason to believe that the component i is failed. The 0.75 and the 0 constitute a belief function. Thus there is no requirement that belief not committed to a given proposition should be committed to its negation. The second point of evidence theory is that belief measures of uncertainty may be assigned to overlapping sets and subsets of hypotheses, events or propositions, as well as to individual hypothesis. Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, which can be considered as an alternative approach to represent uncertainties, has gained an increasing amount of attention both from the theoretical and the applied point of view. [32] [33] [34] [35] In a finite discrete space, D-S theory is a generalization of probability theory where probabilities are assigned to sets instead of mutually exclusive singletons. This theory is still a young field compared with other theories and its main application is data fusion.
This article presents an original method to integrate, in a quantitative way, the human, organizational and technical factors to risk analysis in railway accidents using belief functions theory. We use a graphical model called evidential networks (ENs) on which we quantify beliefs given by experts and the relationships between the different factors through a valuation network. The advantage of such a method is that it presents a natural and intuitive way for the experts to understand and use the model. To make an analogy, one can say that ENs are to belief functions that Bayesian networks (BNs) are to probability theory. They are both used to represent and propagate our beliefs but the deployment of BNs is sometimes inadequate for situations involving partial or total ignorance. 36 Take, for example, the study done by Contini et al., 37 they provided the same reference subject (an amonia storage facility) to 11 teams representing control authorities, research organizations, engineering companies and industries. After a complete probabilistic risk assessment was performed, the results differed over several orders of magnitude. This is a direct evidence that eliciting precise probabilities can conduct to abusively precise values as they can differ greatly from one expert to another. On the contrary, as ENs are based on belief functions theory, ignorance or imprecise knowledge can be easily modeled by using lower and upper estimates of the different factors. This way our models can be more conservative and more representative of our real state of knowledge. More precisely, this article proposes four contributions.
1. How to construct human reliability data in the belief functions framework (we added this section to the article) from both observations and experts' opinion with some basic examples.
2. How to combine experts' opinion in the belief functions framework.
A general method to apply ENs and fault trees
(FTs) in the evaluation of belief occurrence of accidents. 4. An application of the proposed approach in the evaluation of belief occurrence of a railway accident and a comparison with results obtained using classical approaches based on Monte-Carlo simulations.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In 'Belief functions theory', we provide a background of belief functions theory. Some basic notions of valuations-based systems (VBSs) and ENs are then presented. In 'Construction of reliability data', we describe the development of the combined EN and FT model. 'Case study' demonstrates the proposed methodology on the example of a railway accident, ending with 'Conclusions'.
Belief functions theory
In the 1960s, Dempster 38 gave birth to the D-S theory, also called evidence theory or belief functions theory, with the study of upper and lower probabilities. Later on, it was extended by Shafer 39 in 1976. Belief functions theory can be seen as an extension of the Bayesian probability theory. The first work using belief functions theory in reliability and risk assessment was presented by Dempster and Kong. 40 In recent years, the belief functions theory was used by many researchers in order to quantify the uncertainty in reliability and risk assessment studies. 34, 35, [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] 
Representing information
The definition domain of the variable of interest x is called the frame of discernment O where all of the possible events are mutually exclusive elementary propositions. It is equivalent to the sample space in probability theory. A basic belief assignment (BBA) on O, also called basic probability assignment (BPA), is a function, m O : 2 O ! ½0, 1, which maps probability masses on events or subsets of events such that X
An agent holding a piece of evidence allocates unitary amounts of beliefs to the different subsets of O. The number m O (A) represents the support of A given by the agent's belief. 46 There is a distinction between probabilities and BBAs: probability distribution functions are defined on O and BBAs on the power set 2 O . Moreover, the additivity hypothesis is not required in belief functions theory as it is in probability theory. The subsets A & O such that m O (A) . 0 are called focal sets of m O . Full knowledge is represented by a BBA having a singleton fxg (x 2 O) as a unique focal set. A Bayesian BBA is a special case where all of the focal sets are singletons and is equivalent to probabilities. Complete ignorance is represented by a BBA having only one focal element equal to O and is called vacuous. Finally BBAs have some other properties, that distinguishes them from probability functions. 47 It is not necessary that m
is not always equal to 1.
Belief and plausibility functions
As we impose the closed world hypothesis that states that the answer is strictly found inside our frame of discernment, we add two constraints to the belief function: Bel(O) = 1 and Bel(Ø) = 0. The inverse formula called the Mo¨bius transform of Bel is defined as
where jAj represents the cardinality of A. A plausibility function Pl on O is a function Pl: 2 O ! ½0, 1 defined as
Bel(A) is obtained by summing the BBAs of the propositions that totally agree with A whereas Pl is obtained by summing BBAs of propositions that agree with A totally or partially (cf. Figure 1) . ½Bel(A), Pl(A) can be viewed as the interval that describes the uncertainty of A. Bel and Pl are related by
where A is the negation of the event A.
Combination operations
The purpose of information aggregation related to event occurrence is to summarize data whether the data are coming from a single source or multiple sources. There are many aggregation techniques such as arithmetic averages, geometric averages, harmonic averages, maximum and minimum values. Combination rules are the types of aggregation techniques for data obtained from multiple sources that provide different assessments for the same event.
Consider two distinct and independent pieces of evidence m O i and m O j from two different and reliable sources i and j. In belief functions theory, the principal combination rules are the conjunctive and disjunctive combination rules. 39 The conjunctive combination is given by
The disjunctive combination is given by
The Dempster's rule of combination is the fundamental rule in belief functions theory for combining items of evidence. This rule is defined as the conjunctive combination of two BBAs followed by a normalization
k is called the conflict factor between the two pieces of evidence i and j.
Conditioning
The conditioned mass function is intended to represent the impact of additional information. The conditioning in belief functions theory is used both for prediction from observations and revision of uncertain information. 48 When dealing with prediction, we have at our disposal a model of the world (e.g. belief occurrence degrees of principals causes of a human error) under the form of a BBA distribution. Moreover we get some new observations B on the current state of the world (e.g. occurrence of one cause of human error). Then, one tries to predict some property A of the current world with its associated degree of belief (e.g. predict the human error occurrence). The conditional BBA m(AjB) (the belief of observation of A in context B) is used for estimating the degree of belief that the current world satisfies A. Conditioning in belief functions theory requires a sort of independence. Define the mass function m, the conditional of m given B for A O is given by
where K is the normalization factor defined by K À1 = P C jC\B6 ¼Ø m(C). For example m(e i ju i ) = 0:2 means that when an expert receives a new information u i , his degree of belief that ''an human error e i will occur'' is 0.2.
Basics of VBSs and ENs
The VBSs were introduced by Shenoy 49 in 1989 as general frameworks for managing uncertainty in expert systems. In rule-based languages, a domain knowledge is represented by variables and rules. The operator used to make inferences from the knowledge is modus ponens, which can be summarized as: p implies q; p is asserted to be true, so therefore q must be true. A categorical rule is a rule defined without uncertainty. In valuation-based languages (VBLs), a domain knowledge is represented by variables and valuations. The operators used to make inferences from the knowledge are called combination and marginalization. Thus the VBLs have two parts: a static part that is concerned with representation of knowledge, and a dynamic part that is concerned with reasoning with knowledge. For more details, see Shenoy. 49 VBL Static part. Let X denote a variable. The set of its possible values will be denoted by O X and referred to as the frame of X. If h is a non-empty set of variables then O h denotes the Cartesian product of O X for X 2 h: Dynamic part. A crucial point in VBL is the use of local computations to optimize the propagation of beliefs. In order to compute marginals on the joint valuation, the local computations use two operations called combination and marginalization. The combination is a mapping : V3V ! V used to combine valuations G and H on g and h to produce valuation G H on g [ h.
The marginalization is a mapping # h : [fV g jh gg ! V h used to produce valuations on subsets of the given set of variables such that if G is a valuation on g and h g, then G #h is a valuation on h. G #h is called the marginal of G to h.
A VBL makes inference by first combining all valuations in the system in order to obtain the joint valuation. Then the marginalization operation is used to obtain the marginal of the variable of interest.
Evidential systems (ES)
A VBS is a formal mathematical system for representation of and reasoning with knowledge. It consists of a five-tuple fE, O E , V E , , #g where E denotes a finite set of variables E, O E denotes the set of frames and V E the set of all valuations.
The graphical representation of a VBS is a graph called a valuation network where the nodes represent either valuations or variables. When the valuations are expressed using BBAs, the VBS is called an ES.
A categorical rule x 1^x2^. . .^x n ! y is represented by a categorical BBA on the frame 
On the other hand, if we hold some doubt about the rule x ! y, our degree of belief can be quantified as
Consider for example a study to evaluate the reliability of a risk expert E. We know that at least 80% of risk experts that are working in factory A are not reliable and at least 90% of risk experts that are working in factory B are reliable.
We suppose that the variables A = a, B = b and R = r represent, respectively, the propositions ''the risk expert E works in factory A'', ''the risk expert E works in factory B'', ''the risk expert E is reliable''. The BBAs representing the fact that at least 80% of risk experts that work in factory A are not reliable are
r), ( a, r), ( a, r)g) = 0:8
The BBAs representing the fact that at least 90% of risk experts that work in factory B are reliable are
The obtained EN is shown in Figure 2 . First we suppose that we have no prior BBAs about the fact that the expert E works in factory A or B, i.e.
The preliminary results obtained using the Dempster rule of combination, without receiving any information, is that the belief interval that the expert E is reliable is [0,1] (cf . Table 1 ). Then, we receive the information 1 that the expert E works in factory A. This information is represented by m O A 0 (fag) = 1. The obtained belief interval that the expert is not reliable is [0.8,1]. Finally we received the second information that the expert E works also in factory B, which is represented by m O B 0 (fbg) = 1. As we can see, this information weakens the fact that the expert E is not reliable, which justifies the fact that the obtained belief interval that the expert is not reliable is [0.2857,0.3571] (cf. Table 1 ).
Construction of reliability data
In railway risk assessment, there are two different sources of information available about the human errors.
Expert opinion in the form of values or bounds on human errors in presence of some events. Data in the form of the number of human errors in the presence of some events or time of observations.
Lower and upper expectations
We first need to introduce some basic concepts. Let The lower and upper expectations of a measurable, bounded and real-valued function f with respect to m are defined as 51
where E p (f) = Ð f(a)P(da) denotes the expectation of function f with respect to P.
Lower expectations can be obtained from upper expectations through the expression
It can be shown that in the continuous case 51
In the discrete case, we have 38
Construction of human errors data based on experts opinions
Let X be a indicator variable for the occurrence of a human error in the presence on an event. The occurrence of a human error is a Bernoulli process with a parameter p corresponding to the occurrence of error and 1 À p corresponds to the absence of error. Thus we have Thus, the occurrence of human error p in presence of noisy environment is given by p 2 ½0:0044, 0:2065.
Construction of human errors data based on observations
Let us now assume that, instead of eliciting expert opinion, we have made n independent observations X 1 , . . . , X n of X. Given data of x human errors in n presence of noisy environment, what is the probability of human error in presence of noisy environment. The formulas for the upper and lower expectation of p are defined as
Example 2: Suppose in 15 observations, we have human errors in three observations. Then we have The occurrence of human error p 1 in presence of noisy environment is given by p 1 2 ½0:1875, 0:2500. In the case we use the observations made in another railway system (prior belief): in 35 In this case, the occurrence of human error p 2 in presence of noisy environment is given by p 2 2 ½0:1429, 0:1714. Finally, the aggregation of the two observations give p 12 2 ½0:1429, 0:2500.
Comparison with Laplace, LME (maximum likelihood estimate) and Bayesian approaches
As shown in Table 2 , all three methods (Laplace, LME and Bayesian approaches) are contained within the upper and lower expectations given by belief functions. Furthermore, as n ! +' the upper and lower bounds of the belief function converge, yielding a Bayesian estimate which is the same in all four methods.
A combined approach based on ENs and FT analysis

Introduction
Within the context of this article, we use the definition of human errors given by Swain and Guttman: 1 An error is an out of tolerance action, where the limits of tolerable performance are defined by the system. The human error is then considered as a deviation from expected performance (signal passed at danger (SPAD) incidents, over speeding, etc.) and this deviation is defined by the consequence (immediate dangerous situation or accident).
Owing to its capability in modeling the systems, ENs have been combined with FT analysis method to determine the belief occurrence of the railway accident. The proposed approach consists of five steps.
Constructing a cause effect diagram. At this stage
we identify the principal causes and their subcauses. 
Construction of cause effect diagram
In order to identify, sort, and display possible causes of the railway accident we use the cause effect diagram method, which graphically illustrates the relationship between a given outcome and all the factors that influence the outcome. This type of diagram is sometimes called an ''Ishikawa diagram'' because it was invented by Kaoru Ishikawa, 52 or a ''fishbone diagram'' because of the way it looks. The diagram's structure includes a central ''bone'' with the topic of interest attached at the right-hand end. Branching out from the central line are ''sub-bones'' that represent primary causal factors, and each of these in turn has sub-bones representing subsidiary contributing factors. For example, consider a railway accident where the driver passes the signal at danger. The driver have mistakenly read the signal aspect for an adjacent line. The investigations concluded that the driver read an adjacent signal that was displaying a single yellow cautionary aspect owing to three principal causes: driver route knowledge, infrastructure factors and driver alertness. Three sub-causes dr 1 , dr 2 and dr 3 were associated with the driver route knowledge, two sub-causes i 1 and i 2 were associated with the infrastructure factors, and three sub-causes da 1 , da 2 and da 3 were associated with the driver alertness. The cause effect diagram of this example is presented in Figure 3 .
Construction of evidential network
The relations between each principal cause and its subcauses are represented by an EN. The task consists on computing the marginal beliefs for the principal causes. The models of principal causes are shown in the form of ENs, where the variables are represented by circular nodes and the BBAs valuations by diamond shapes. Each valuation node is connected by edges to the subset of variables which define its domain. For example, let us consider the principal cause ''Driver route represent the relations between the variable D and the variables dr 1 , dr 2 and dr 3 (cf. Figure 4 ). In this article, owing to insufficiency data, we use expert opinions to define the conditional and prior BBAs. Then we use marginalization and Dempster combination to obtain BBAs of principal causes.
Combined FT with ENs
A FT represents how combinations of basic events lead to the occurrence of the undesired event (top event). In this work, the principal causes are the basic events (cf. Figure 5 ) of the FT and we aim to compute the belief occurrence of the top event using the BBAs of principal causes computed using the ENs.
Based on our previous works proposed in Aguirre et al. 53 and Sallak et al. 34 we can compute the interval belief of top event occurrence using the BBAs of basic events and the minimal cut sets of the FT. Let us consider that for each basic event e i , the state of belief on its occurrence is bounded by ½Bel(fe i g), Pl(fe i g) defined over O e i = fe i , e i g where e i and e i denote, respectively, the occurrence and the absence of event e i . The belief occurrence of the undesired event is obtained using equation 30 where N C is the number of minimal cuts in the FT and C i is the index set of the i th minimal cut set
where size(C i ) denotes the number of basic events in the minimal cut set C i . Therefore, the belief occurrence of the top undesired event is bounded by the interval ½Bel(fe top g), Pl(fe top g).
In the previous example, when the driver passes the signal at danger, we have three minimal cut sets. The belief and plausibility measures are obtained as
In some cases, risk engineers need to convert the interval beliefs of top event occurrences to robability measures. Such a transformation is called a probabilistic transformation. We define the probabilistic transformation as a mapping f : m ! P where P denotes the probability distribution and m the BBA function. 54 A probabilistic transformation f is: The most known probabilistic transformation is the pignistic transformation BetP. It was introduced by Smets and Kennes 55 and corresponds to the generalized insufficient reason principle: a BBA assigned to the union of n atomic sets is split equally among these n sets. The pignistic transformation BetP is the only one that has the three properties: a-consistency, p-consistency and ulb-consistency. It is defined for any set B O and B 6 ¼ Ø by
where A j j denotes the cardinality of A O. In the case of FT analysis and closed-world hypothesis (i.e. m(Ø) = 0), the pignistic top event occurrence BetP(fe top g) is given by
It should be noted that other probabilistic transformations were also defined using different kinds of mappings either proportional to the plausibility, to the normalized plausibility, to all plausibilities, to the belief or a hybrid mapping. 56 
Case study
Description of situation
This section presents a case study that illustrates the main principles of our methodology. The model is based on a situation on which there was a near headto-head encounter between two trains. The event took place early in the morning after some maintenance works performed during the night shift. The idea here is to study how several organizational, technical and human factors influenced the occurrence of this situation, i.e. we want to measure the risk of a head-to-head encounter given the surrounding conditions of the scenario. In a way, it can be seen as a sensitivity analysis of how the different factors (and its epistemic uncertainty) could have affected the occurrence (risk) of the head-to-head encounter. Although it is an hypothetical situation, it was inspired by the analysis of several reports of real case studies done by the BEATT ('Bureau d'Enqueˆtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre' French land transport accident investigation bureau). The scenario takes place in a railway section between three stations A, B and C (cf. Figure 6 ). Some maintenance works were scheduled on one side of the railway track heading west (Head 2). To allow the traffic to continue, all passing trains heading in this direction were redirected to the other track in the opposite direction (Head 1). In these kind of situations, protective measures are installed to avoid a potential accident. Moreover, the circulation agenda of the commercial trains is slightly modified. The works extended over 10 km, they took place over the night and were programmed to end early in the morning in order to avoid unnecessary delays in the commercial trains. The maintenance involved two trains (named engineering trains TTX1 and TTX2). The works were supervised by a foreman and the movement of the trains was controlled by a traffic agent.
Early in the morning, when the engineering trains where performing the final maneuvers to clear the tracks, the train TTX2 encountered head to head with a commercial train TER going in the opposite direction. The near accident was caused by a series of unexpected events. To start with, train TTX2 was initially planned to park in a zone near station C as soon as the maintenance works were finished. A delay on the works forced to change the initial parking position of train TTX2 so as to avoid unnecessary disturbances of the early morning commercial trains. When the proposed changes were going to be implemented, the foreman realized that the access to the newly reserved parking position (Zone 3) for train TTX2 was blocked by train TTX1, therefore, he was rushed into a second change of parking positions under complicated measures. Badly advised by the traffic agent, he chose to park the train in Zone 2 in a manner that forced it to pass by a protected zone running in an opposite direction (the place of the near accident). When the train TTX2 was going to engage the protected zone, he encountered a closed signal that forbade him from crossing. The driver of the train called the traffic agent who decided to grant him the permission to cross the closed signal without taking into account the early morning timetable of the commercial trains. As a consequence of these series of events, the near accident happened (cf. Figure 6 ).
After a deep analysis of the circumstances, four basic events are identified as the precursors of the near accident, namely the following.
Bad change of parking plans. The decision to change the parking plans of the engineering train TTX2 was taken by the foreman thanks to several factors. To start with, the planning was delayed at the beginning putting some extra pressure to finish the work on time. Moreover, the traffic agent validated the change of plans with a lack of knowledge of the different parking positions of the train station and their state of occupancy. In addition, the foreman was in a very noisy environment when he took the decision. Finally, there was over-familiarity between the foreman and the traffic agent. Crossing permission of closed signal. The traffic agent granted the permission to cross the closed signal to the train driver because he had the illusion of a ''safe'' situation. Indeed, as all of the signals in the working area were closed, he thought that there was no danger. He forgot that the signals were all closed on the moment that a train entered the protected area running in the opposite direction. He maybe was not aware about the reduced overlap between signals. As a consequence, he did not take into account the timetable of the commercial trains and did not realized that a train was heading in the direction of the accident. This situation is considered a consequence of the lack of experience of the traffic agent or owing to a poor traffic agent interface design. He also based his decision on the fact that others had already granted the permission to cross the same signals. He thought, ''Somebody already verified the situation, it should work this time''. Blocked road. The train TTX1 was blocking the way of train TTX2, causing more delays on the parking maneuvers. The way the initial plan was stated, this situation should not have happened because the parking track of the trains headed in an opposite direction. Reduction of speed at time. Finally, the traffic agent could not ask the driver of the train to reduce speed at time owing to a system communication failure.
The near accident model
The four basic events identified are considered as the principal causes of the near accident. Two of them are considered as technical, the blocked road and the reduction of speed at time and the two others are considered as events influenced by human and organizational factors, as indicated in the following descriptions.
Bad change of parking plans (BR)
Noisy environment: The foreman had to take the decision in a noisy environment which made the communication with the traffic agent complicated and created a harsh work environment.
Traffic agent confirmation: The traffic agent confirmed that the new plan was feasible, but complicated. In reality it was not, but the foreman trusted in his opinion. Delay on works: Several delays at the beginning and during the work forced the traffic agent to change the plans. Over-familiarity between the foreman and the traffic agent.
Crossing permission of closed signal (CR)
Pre-existing confirmations: The traffic agent based his decision on the fact that others had already granted the permission to cross the same signals. The near accident (NA) is illustrated with the cause effect diagram presented in Figure 7 and the fault tree presented in Figure 8 . A list of the variables with their descriptions is given in Table 3 . As shown in the cause represent, respectively, the relations between the variable BD and the variables NE, TC, DW, and OF obtained from conditional BBAs given by experts. For example, according to Table 4 , which presents conditional and prior BBAs for the different factors, we have m O BD (fBDgjfNEg) = 0:02, this will be represented by the following BBAs 
Quantitative analysis of the near accident
First, the Dempster combination rule is used to obtain the joint BBAs of the two ENs. Then the marginalization operation is used to obtain the marginal BBAs of the variables BD and CR. Finally, using BBAs of basic events of the FT (BD, CR, RS and BR) the top event belief occurrence (the occurrence of NA) is computed using formula given in equation (30) and the pignistic values are computed using equation (32) .
First, we consider that the experts give only conditional BBAs and they have no knowledge about the prior BBAs of the variables. We represent this situation by vacuous BBAs (cf. Table 4 ) According to Table 5 , in the case of no prior belief about BBAs of factors (initial information), the risk of accident is bounded by ½0, 0:06. The pignistic value of the risk of accident occurrence is 0.03 (cf. Table 6 ). Now suppose that m O DW (fDWg) = 0:3, m O DW (fDWg) = 0:2 and m O DW (fDW, DWg) = 0:5 (information 1). This is equivalent to the fact that degree of occurrence of the event DW is ½0:3, 0:8. The risk of accident is then bounded by ½0, 0:042. Let us suppose the fact that we are certain that the traffic agent interface design was poor and there is a delay on work (information 2). This will be represented by m O TC (fTCg) = 1; m O DW (fDWg) = 1
The risk of accident is then bounded by ½0:00005, 0:06. As we can see the belief over the occurrence of the near accident is increased because it depends significantly on the events DW and TC.
Finally suppose the fact that we are certain of the occurrence of all factors (information 3). This will be represented by The risk of accident is then bounded by ½0:00525, 0:06000. The pignistic value of the risk of accident occurrence is 0.0326 (cf. Table 6 ). As we can expect, the belief and pignistic values of the near accident occurrence have increased.
In this probabilistic approach, we use Monte-Carlo sampling simulations to repeatedly sample component failure probabilities from the appropriate distributions, and to calculate and record the system's reliabilities. We choose uniform and normal distribution for the probabilities of events occurrence. The confidence interval of the probabilistic approach is 99%. Table 7 presents the results computed by the belief functions and by probabilistic approaches. It shows that the differences between results obtained using these two different approaches are very small. However, the width of the support defined by the belief functions approach is higher than the width of the support in the probabilistic approach because the belief approach is more conservative. By assuming uniform and normal distributions for probabilities of events occurrence, we introduce more uncertainty into the probabilistic approach and the results depends on the chosen law, which is not the case in the belief function approach.
Conclusions
This article presents a first attempt to account for human factors in risk analysis using belief functions Table 7 . Comparison between belief functions and probabilistic approaches. Information 1  Information 2  Information 3 theory. The EN operations are used to elicit the masses of the basic events when they are influenced by several factors, and finally, the belief over the basic events is propagated to the top undesired event.
Initial situation
The advantage of the presented method is that our state of belief about the conditional relationship between the different factors and the basic beliefs does not have to be perfect. Indeed, the method is well suited to account for ignorance and a priori knowledge about the basic events are not needed.
